INTRODUCTION
Since the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the concept of the responsibility to protect in 2001 the term has gone a long way from document to doctrine and practice. Yet a decade later there are still numerous unresolved matters concerning the prevention of atrocities and the legitimacy of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The disagreements on the international arena may be linked to divergent points of view between Western and emerging powers. Whilst there is still some resistance to the idea of a responsibility to protect, especially in the global south, the main debates on the existence and justification of a responsibility to protect are mostly over. 1 The central question has now become how to implement this responsibility, or how to transform words into deeds.
2
This second generation debate on the responsibility protect has gained ground since the successful deployment of the concept during the intervention in Libya. Yet despite the overall positive evaluation of the intervention, emerging powers were quick to perceive the blurring of the line between protecting civilians and regime change. They also raised eyebrows to the expansive interpretation of Security Council resolutions and to the lack of accountability mechanisms for the use of force in implementation of the mandate. As a response to these shortcomings and in an effort to bring new light to the debate on the responsibility to protect, in late 2011 Brazil proposed the complementary concept of a 'responsibility while protecting'.
In this paper we will look at how this new notion may play a bridging role between Western and emerging countries, rebalancing the concept of the responsibility to protect and strengthening its role in international politics. On the other hand, a critical approach to both the responsibility to protect and the responsibility while protecting will be presented in an effort to show how their discourse still contains blind spots and biases that have not been taken into account by the institutionalised debate. The ultimate goal of this essay is therefore to provide a broad look at the development of the responsibility to protect, highlighting the challenges and difficulties it faces. In doing so, it hopes to suggest how the idea may continue to advance and shape the way we think about humanitarian intervention.
The first chapter will provide an account of the context that steered the formulation of the notion of a responsibility to protect and will detail the initial proposal of the ICISS. Subsequently, the second chapter will narrate the important moments in the development of the concept, such as the war in Iraq in 2003 and the World Summit in 2005. The following part will continue this narrative, with a focus on the recent conflict in Libya as the catalyst to the Brazilian suggestion of a responsibility while protecting. After detailing this new concept, we will examine how the responsibility to protect may be enriched by its complementary notion. The penultimate chapter will therefore explore the potential for bridging the divide between Western and emerging powers on humanitarian intervention.
Notwithstanding this potential, the final chapter will end this paper by stressing the limited nature of the institutional debate so far. This input of critical analysis is intended to foster new enquiries on the parallel development of the responsibility to protect and the responsibility while protecting.
CHAPTER ONE THE CONCEPTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The importance and actuality of the difficulties revolving around humanitarian intervention is a direct result of the changes the international community has gone through in the past decades. Most significantly, the changing face of conflict has brought to light the new challenges posed by intrastate conflicts, migration, climate change, terrorism, the proliferation of non-state armed groups, cyber warfare and new robotic technologies. 3 In fact, war between states has dramatically declined -they now represent less than five per cent of all conflicts. 4 At the same time, despite the end of the era of colonialism and the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts and ethnic violence persisted throughout the world, becoming problems of crucial importance to international law and politics.
In the field of international law, the political dilemmas concerning humanitarian intervention are crystallised in the tension between the traditional concept of sovereignty and the progressing demand for respect to human rights. That is why it has been stated that 'the vital debate on the foundations and frontiers of humanitarian intervention is perhaps the greatest political question of our time '. 5 In this context, the concept of the responsibility to protect was born out of the debates that occurred throughout the 1990s over humanitarian intervention. 
CHAPTER TWO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM DOCUMENT TO

DOCTRINE
The decade that followed the report proved that the document had gained widespread attention. It is now possible to affirm that the responsibility to protect is past its 'post-ontological era'. 22 Accordingly, the debates concerning its existence and its justification are assumed by some authors to be all but over. 23 A second generation of scholarship has thus recently emerged, whose focus is more on its implementation than on its origins. 24 But before we explore this recent scholarship and the latest developments in the concept it is necessary to briefly review the important occurrences since the publication of the ICISS report. Besides the problem of false friends, the invasion of Iraq seriously undermined the potential the responsibility to protect had to foster action when it was truly needed. In other words, 'to the extent the Iraq war is perceived to indicate the potential for misuse of the R2P doctrine, it will be more difficult next time for us to call on military action when we need it to save potentially hundreds of thousands of lives '. 29 This is precisely what happened in the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, where the international community's slow and ineffective response evidenced that the responsibility to protect still had a long way to becoming an operational principle.
30
The situation in Darfur revealed that the war in Iraq undermined the standing of the United States and the United Kingdom as the responsibility to protect norm carriers.
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The states most associated with the new norm lost credibility due to abuse of the doctrine or use of it in self-serving purposes. The crisis in Darfur also demonstrated that changing the language from humanitarian intervention to responsibility to protect did not genuinely affect the underlying political dynamics. According to Thomas
Weiss, 'military overstretch and the prioritization of strategic concerns to the virtual exclusion of humanitarian ones is the sad reality of a post 9/11 world'. 32 Moreover, the responsibility to protect language was adopted by both those who defended and those who opposed humanitarian intervention: 'it allowed traditional opponents of intervention to replace largely discredited 'sovereignty-as-absolute'-type arguments against intervention in supreme humanitarian emergencies with arguments about who had the primary responsibility to protect Darfur's civilians'.
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Despite all these difficulties, the responsibility to protect did in fact achieve some success in the years that followed the ICISS report. When lessons from Iraq were sinking in, the concept resurfaced and achieved widespread recognition in the 
CHAPTER THREE LIBYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING
The fight against the Gaddafi regime in Libya during the Arab Spring was perhaps the first and only successful case of application of the responsibility to protect. By the time the conflict had evolved into a protracted civil war, it was clear that the regime had no intention to protect its population; Gaddafi had gone to national television to announce that 'officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches' and that 'any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed'. 69 The second key concern that the responsibility while protecting points out is the old problematic of 'false friends' or 'Trojan horses'. Echoing the opinions of many developing countries, the document notes a 'growing perception that the concept of the responsibility to protect might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change'. 70 This is a direct consequence of the recent employment of the responsibility to protect in the war in Libya.
As a conclusion, the Brazilian proposal encourages the development of the concept of the responsibility while protecting in tandem with the responsibility to protect. 71 The former is in fact complementary to the latter. Their evolution should thus occur jointly, 'based on an agreed set of fundamental principles, parameters and procedures'. 72 Nine points are thenceforth proposed as initial assumptions for the elaboration of shared principles and parameters. Succinctly, these are: (a) emphasis on prevention and especially on preventive diplomacy; (b) rigorousness in efforts to exhaust all peaceful means available before contemplating other solutions; (c) when the use of force becomes a necessity, it is subject to authorisation by the Security
Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, or in exceptional circumstances by the General Assembly acting under Resolution 377(V); (d) authorisations to use force must be 'limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements and the scope of military action must abide by the letter and spirit of the mandate conferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly'; 73 (e) the use of force must be the minimal possible and must not cause more harm than that which it seeks to avert; (f) the use of force must be judicious and proportionate, and must always be linked to the objectives established by the Security Council; (g) the aforementioned points must be observed throughout the whole duration of the authorisation to use force; (h) there is a need for enhanced Security Council procedures to monitor and assess the implementation of its resolutions, hence assuring there will be responsibility while protecting; and finally (i) 'the Security Council must ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force'. informal General Assembly discussion on the responsibility while protecting, the United States expressed concern with some of the points related to the concept. 75 It criticised what it regarded as higher thresholds for the legitimacy of military intervention, such as the requirement that the three pillars follow a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing. 76 Furthermore, the United
States claimed that they could not 'bind [themselves] to inaction based on an unrealistic prerequisite of assured success'. 77 Despite there being no mention in the concept paper on the responsibility while protecting of anything like an 'assured success' when intervening, the United States' response highlights the persistent disagreements between North and South on the topic. It is a tension between a potentially intervening North, who wants to assure flexibility and discretion on its use of force, and a peripheral South who is to be the object of such interventions. 78 The
South thus responds through different strategies: it either rejects any notion related to intervention, forever opposing the responsibility to protect, or it seeks to frame the debate and shift its focus towards its apprehensions. 78 On the possibility to generalise a North-South divide on the issue of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect see: Thakur (n 45) 144-160.
CHAPTER FOUR FORGING CONSENSUS: BRIDGING THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE
If the past decade has proved fruitful for the concept of the responsibility to protect, it may be less because of its practical application and more due to its creation of 'a collection of shared expectations '. 79 In this sense, the main thrust of the idea has been to allocate authority in international politics, strengthening the United Nations as the legitimate forum for decisions on humanitarian intervention. As Anne Orford explains, the influence of the responsibility to protect 'lies not in its capacity to transform promise into practice, but rather in its capacity to transform practice into promise, or deeds into words'. 80 In order to continue this path of forging consensus and allocating authority, the North-South divide will have to be shortened. 81 This is where the responsibility while protecting comes in as a useful mode of reframing the debate and encouraging the developing world to take part in it. Thakur calls upon these countries to 'master the so-called New-Diplomacy and become norm entrepreneurs' instead of 'forever opposing, complaining and finding themselves on the losing side anyway'. 82 A lot has already been achieved in defining the responsibility to protect in a way that dismisses early attempts to use it as a justification for unilateral intervention. 83 Yet there is still some way to go towards guaranteeing the responsibility to protect will provide a rules-based system and minimal consensual procedures on humanitarian intervention. Between a North that desires to retain leeway for the deployment of its military forces and a South that is still inclined to frown upon interventionist discourses, the coupling of the responsibility to protect to the responsibility while protecting offers a midway path that 'navigates the treacherous shoals between the Scylla of callous indifference to the plight of victims and the Charybdis of selfrighteous interference in others' internal affairs'. 89 The shift in focus to accountability is a much-needed counterweight to a wider acceptance by developing countries of humanitarian interventions. It is also a necessary development for the rising role of the United Nations as a centre of authority that will be increasingly unable to maintain its neutrality around questions of protection and intervention. 90 This breakdown of neutrality will have to be accompanied by accountability if it is to be accepted by developing states. Thus the responsibility while protecting may provide the missing link for recasting the notion of the responsibility to protect and its application in a multipolar world. 
CHAPTER FIVE RETURN TO SENDER: A CRITIQUE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND WHILE PROTECTING
So far this essay has taken a pragmatic view on the problematic of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. To end it, however, it is worthwhile to take a brief look at critical international law scholarship in order to expose the limits of the discussion that has hitherto been surveyed. Accordingly, our aim is to demonstrate how the concept of the responsibility while protecting can be seen not only as a development but also as a prolongation of the same discourse that sustains the responsibility to protect.
A critical look at the topic may start with the realisation that the era of humanitarian intervention may coincide with the end of human rights. 91 This means that the responsibility to protect underwrites a shift in human rights as a discourse of rebellion and dissent to one of state legitimacy. 92 This is a significant realisation not only for developing countries fighting for international justice, but especially for third world peoples and social movements. It means that to accept a responsibility to protect -even if coupled with a responsibility while protecting -is to condone a narrative that 'relies upon colonial stereotypes of suffering natives or human rights victims as the pivot for establishing the identity of the heroic international community'.
93
The human rights discourse upon which these responsibilities are based has its own limitations and political agenda. In the first place, the shift to accountability and rigorousness in the Brazilian proposal conserves a failure to explore and expand other forms of responsibility. Consequently, the relationship between economic globalisation and insecurity remains on the background while the ability to save human beings through military interventions positions the international community in the role of saviour. 94 The responsibility for the violence produced by the current system is neutralised and normalised in the process. In fact, there is no talk of responsibility for the emergence of insecurity or the causes of extreme poverty. 95 A second way in which the current debate fails to provide appropriate answers to global insecurity is due to the limitations of human rights to convey the demands of the oppressed in the third world who are excluded from the legal-statist framework of rights. Rajagopal thus draws attention to the challenge of including social movements and resistance to globalisation in the narrative of international law. 96 It is in this context that we should see Douzinas' suggestion that the radical and revolutionary potential of human rights is 'radically circumscribed when rights become an apology for state violence'.
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The philosopher Jacques Rancière summarises the aforementioned critical approach by describing the right of humanitarian intervention as 'a sort of return to sender: the disused rights that had been sent to the rightless are sent back to the senders'. 98 This movement is founded on a discourse of absolute victims -object of an absolute evil (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) -and of an avenger, embryonically attached to a responsibility to protect based on a discourse of human rights and humanitarianism which is itself narrow in scope.
CONCLUSION
The concept of the responsibility to protect has flourished since its conception.
Nonetheless, as it enters its 'adolescence' it will inevitably undergo changes and face numerous obstacles. We have traced how the idea has so far managed to overcome its early crisis and has established itself as a central notion in debates on humanitarian intervention. Initially we recalled the move from a document composed by the ICISS to a doctrine endorsed by the international community in the 2005 World Summit.
Subsequently, we outlined the major advances in the years leading to the concept's effective application in Libya. The Libyan intervention, however successful, exposed the responsibility to protect to new difficulties concerning accountability and the extent of the mandate imposed by the Security Council. In this context, we reviewed the proposal of Brazil to supplement the responsibility to protect with a responsibility while protecting.
Once the main points brought up by the responsibility while protecting were presented, we argued that this notion may help bridge the North-South divide when it comes to humanitarian intervention. It may therefore be seen as an exercise in proactive diplomacy by emerging powers that have signalled abandoning former strict opposition to intervention to assume an inclusive role in shaping debate and becoming norm entrepreneurs. While that may hold true for Brazil, India and South Africa, there is still opposition from China and Russia, reflected in the failure to include the responsibility while protecting in the last summit of the BRICS. The ongoing conflict in Syria has added to the lack of consensus and the distancing of China and Russia not only from Western powers but also from other emerging nations.
102
Finally, a brief look at what critical international legal scholarship has to say about the responsibility to protect disclosed the limits of the current debate and of the proposal of a responsibility while protecting. We highlighted that other forms of responsibility -for global inequality or for the causes of insecurity and povertywere being sidelined by a discourse reminiscent of colonial times, based on stereotypes of victims and saviours. Furthermore, we questioned if the era of humanitarian intervention could mean the end of human rights as an emancipatory and revolutionary discourse.
In a final analysis, the debate that was initiated on the responsibility while protecting is first and foremost a confirmation of the triumph of the responsibility to protect. Accordingly, if the responsibility to protect is 'our normative instrument of choice to convert a shocked international conscience into timely and decisive collective action', 103 it should not only be complemented by a responsibility while protecting, but also by a broader examination of responsibility for global injustice and insecurity.
